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The Atrophying of the Reasonable Doubt
Standard: The United States Supreme
Court's Missed Opportunity in Victor v.
Nebraska And its Implications in the
Courtroom
George M. Dery III*
I. Introduction
The fundamental principle that an accused will suffer conviction
only upon the government's proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has
ultimately gained an enigmatic status. The reasonable doubt standard of
persuasion is a body of law which is so robust that the United States
Constitution mandates its use in every criminal trial in our nation. Yet,
this standard suffers from a basic vulnerability; no one seems able to
precisely define it. Therefore, an enormous risk exists that the reasonable
doubt standard may be misstated by judges, misapplied by jurors, and
misunderstood by all participants. Any rule which creates confusion
rather than clarity may eventually wither from improper use.
The significance of the reasonable doubt rule is difficult to overstate.
In 1970, the Supreme Court explicitly held in In Re Winship' that due
process commands that the accused be protected against conviction
"except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged."2 This stringent standard
of persuasion is necessary to protect interests of "transcending value"3 :
the criminal defendant's liberty4 and reputation.' Further, the reasonable
doubt standard has evolved beyond a rule of fundamental fairness into an
actual barometer of the freeness of our society.6

*Assistant Professor, California State University Fullerton, Department of Political Science and
Criminal Justice, former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California, J.D. 1987 Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles, B.A. 1983 University of California Los Angeles.
1. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2. Id. at 364.
3. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1957).
4. Id.
5. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
6. Justice Frankfurter described the reasonable doubt rule as a notion "basic in our law and
rightly one of the boasts of a free society." Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). See also Donald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt Rule,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1665 (1987).
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Moreover, the reasonable doubt burden of proof has had an immense
practical impact on our entire criminal justice system. The absence of a
reasonable doubt jury instruction "distorts the very structure of [a] trial"
and, therefore, can never constitute harmless error.7 The Supreme
Court's refusal to consider an improper reasonable doubt instruction
harmless error is particularly telling in light of the fact that severe
breaches of constitutional rights, such as admission of an involuntary
confession at trial, are subject to harmless error analysis.8 Further, the
reasonable doubt standard is omnipresent; it applies to every criminal
trial. 9 The significance of this omnipresence becomes apparent when the
reasonable doubt standard is contrasted with other crucial rights, such as
the rights to counsel and jury trial, which are not mandated in every
criminal case.'"
This standard influences every criminal case, and the impact of the
reasonable doubt formulation is not limited to jury verdicts. Parties
negotiate plea bargains with an eye to how their cases would be weighed
by juries applying the reasonable doubt rule. In fact, even before a
criminal defendant sees the inside of a courtroom, her fate is often
affected by this standard. This, of course, is because every case is tested
by the reasonable doubt standard at its very outset when the prosecutor
considers filing charges."

Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard might be necessary to ensure preservation of the
presumption of innocence, a distinct, yet related, concept in criminal law. See Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Role and The Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989)("[T]he
presumption of innocence is given vitality primarily through the requirement that the government
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). The presumption of innocence has
received the following treatment:
More grandiose prose rarely is found than that used to describe the role of the
presumption of innocence in Anglo-American criminal law. The presumption has been
called the "golden thread" that runs throughout the criminal law, heralded as the
"cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon justice," and identified as the "focal point of any concept
of due process." Indeed, the presumption has become so central to the popular view of
the criminal justice system, it has taken on "some of the characteristics of superstition."
Id. at 457 (footnotes omitted).
7. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). See also Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
8. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291.
9. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
10. See Argersinger v. Hamlin 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11. In determining whether to file a case, prosecutors are ethically obligated to consider not
only factual guilt, but legal guilt as well. This entails weighing the admissible evidence against
possible defenses to determine whether an objective fact finder would find the accused guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. See 1 American Bar Association StandardsFor CriminalJustice 3-3.9 (1980),
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provide, in part, that "a prosecutor
should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in

THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

Reasonable doubt's central role in American criminal justice existed
long before the Supreme Court recognized it as a right of due process in
1970. Possibly the earliest mention of the reasonable doubt standard of
proof is in the famous Boston massacre trials of 1770.2 Additionally,
the rule came into regular use over a century ago. 3
However, despite its position at the core of our criminal justice
system, the reasonable doubt standard has been severely weakened over
the past quarter of a century.14 Certainly, this trend may be due to a
shift in society's "assessment of the relative burdens of erroneous
acquittal and erroneous conviction." 5 Of course, the government itself
has an interest in lowering the hurdles it must clear to gain a conviction.
Yet, equally evident is another phenomenon; trial courts are finding
reasonable doubt difficult to implement, and appellate courts are
discovering it awkward to define. 6
Thus, the reasonable doubt
threshold may be drifting into disuse largely because no one knows where
to place it.
Many courts are rudderless, as they have received no clear direction
from the United States Supreme Court. This confusion is particularly
troubling because of the context in which the reasonable doubt rule
operates. Unlike most legal principles, reasonable doubt is given force
primarily by jurors, who, by the very design of our system, are usually
lay people. A nebulous rule of law is problematic when applied by
attomeys and jurists, trained legal professionals. When applied by those
unschooled in the intricacies of criminal procedure, unclear legal
principals may become complete nullities. The problem is magnified
further because jurors are called upon to implement the reasonable doubt
standard during deliberation on a defendant's guilt, the ultimate fact at
issue in a trial. Thus, when the stakes for the individual and society are
highest, nonlawyers are left to implement a rule from which even judges
themselves shrink.

the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction."
Id. (emphasis added).
12. See Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 516 (1975).
13. Id. at 519. Dr. Morano, after arguing that the reasonable doubt standard first appeared in
1770, went on to note regular use of the rule within the various states between the 1820s and 1870s.
Id.
14. See Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106
HARv. L. REv. 1093 (1993); Dripps, supra note 6.
15. Note, supra note 14, at 1109.
16. Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define orNot to Define, 90 COLUM. L.R.
1716, 1720 (1990).
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In the 1994 term, the United States Supreme Court had the
opportunity to reinvigorate the reasonable doubt threshold by clearly
defining this constitutional standard. Instead, in Victor v. Nebraska,17 ,
the High Court deepened the existing disorder with an opinion that
fragmented issues and provided only reactive reasoning. The Court could
have alleviated the ambiguities surrounding the reasonable doubt
threshold with its review of jury instructions from California and
Nebraska. However, the Court squandered this opportunity by handing
down an opinion that lacked a reasoned foundation for its holding.
Part II of this Article will examine the origins and evolution of the
reasonable doubt rule. Part III will critically examine the Supreme
Court's discussion of reasonable doubt in Victor v. Nebraska. Finally,
Part IV will explore the theoretical and practical implications of the
Court's failure to delineate the reasonable doubt standard.
II. The Origins and Evolution of the Reasonable Doubt Standard
The reasonable doubt standard has experienced a peculiar history in
American jurisprudence, due in part to the Supreme Court's apparent
ambivalence toward this rule. The High Court's opinions in this area are
a strange combination of words of praise and actions of antipathy. The
reasonable doubt burden of persuasion was only recognized by the Court
as a fundamental right of due process after nearly two centuries of
existence. Both before and after this formal acknowledgment, the Court
weakened the reasonable doubt standard with its hesitation and
inconsistency.
Like so much else about this standard of proof, the very origins of
the reasonable doubt formulation are uncertain.
The "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard apparently was first used in the Boston
Massacre Trials of 1770." However, a competing theory identifies the
Irish Treason cases of the late eighteenth century as first using this
rule.' 9 Even the original purpose behind the introduction of this burden
of persuasion is an unsettled issue. Scholars disagree as to whether
reasonable doubt was articulated in order to raise or lower the

17. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
18. Rex v. Wemms, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 98, 309
(L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). See Morano, supra note 12, at 508-19; Barbara J.
Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 170-71 (1986).
19. Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 981-82 (1993).
But see Morano, supra note 13, at 515, in which the author characterized the Dublin, Ireland treason
trials as the "traditional" view incorrectly advanced by Judge May and adopted by Dean Wigmore
and Dean McCormick.
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government's burden of proof.2 ° These uncertainties, along with the
very meaning of the reasonable doubt formulation, never have been
adequately addressed by the Supreme Court. This seems to be due to the
Court's own confusion regarding reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court's mixed feelings toward reasonable doubt are
expressed in its early opinions, handed down only decades after the
reasonable doubt standard gained prominence among most of the states.
For example, in 1880, the High Court held that a criminal conviction
must be based on evidence which excludes "all reasonable doubt."'"
The Court then refused to provide any guidance regarding the meaning
of this crucial standard, characterizing the jury instruction at issue as
"very favorable to the accused., 22 Furthermore, the Court opined that
"[a]ttempts to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' 23do not usually result
in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.
The internal inconsistency of the Supreme Court's approach to the
reasonable doubt standard of persuasion is particularly evident in Hopt v.
Utah.24 The Hopt Court characterized reasonable doubt as "simple, and
as a rule to guide the jury [ ] as intelligible to them generally as any
which could be stated. 25 Yet, within the very same paragraph, the
Hopt Court indicated that despite its simplicity, reasonable doubt is

20. Commentators have surmised that defense lawyers in the Irish Treason cases may have
sought to raise the burden of persuasion by advocating reasonable doubt Yet, it has also been
asserted that prosecutors welcomed the standard because they viewed it as lowering the threshold of
proof. Newman, supra note 19, at 981-82. Professor Morano argues that prosecutors advocated the
reasonable doubt standard as a replacement for the higher "any doubt" degree of proof. Morano,
supra note 12, at 508-15. Professor Morano believes that state lawyers, faced with ever more
restrictive rules of evidence limiting their presentations to juries and the emergence of defendants'
rights to present a defense, viewed the reasonable doubt rule as compensation for such defense
advantages. Id.See also Shapiro, supra note 18, at 170. Dr. Shapiro perceives the reasonable doubt
formulation as merely a clarification of the previously used "moral certainty" and "satisfied belief'
standards rather than the creation of a new standard of persuasion.
21. Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).
22. Id. The Miles court gave the following instruction regarding reasonable doubt:
The prisoner's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is such as will produce an abiding conviction in the
mind to a moral certainty that the fact exists that is claimed to exist, so that
you feel certain that it exists. A balance of proof is not sufficient. A juror in
a criminal case ought not to condemn unless the evidence excludes from his
mind all reasonable doubt; unless he be so convinced by the evidence, no
matter what the class of the evidence, of the defendant's act upon that
conviction in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own dearest
personal interests.
Id.at 309.
23. Id.at 312.
24. 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
25. Id. at 440.
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somehow very fragile. The Court stated: "The rule may be, and often
is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to create
doubts instead of removing them."26 Thus, the Supreme Court perceives
the reasonable doubt standard as so basic that, in many cases, it may be
read to lay persons without any explanation. Yet, this same rule can
suddenly become confused if defined by judges who are supposed to be
expert in the law.27
The Supreme Court's discomfort with the reasonable doubt standard
was brought into bold relief by the court's own reaction to the mandate
it created in Winship. In Winship, the Court exalted the reasonable doubt
rule as playing "a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure."28 In fact, Winship identified the reasonable doubt standard
as the "prime instrument" for reducing the danger of convictions based
on "factual error."29 Additionally, the Court stated that the reasonable
doubt standard "provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."' 30 Indeed, Winship labelled reasonable doubt as "indispensable"
for community "respect and confidence" in the legal system, for it is this
standard of persuasion which preserves the "moral force" of our criminal
law. 3 The Court gave force to this sweeping language by holding that
the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally mandated in criminal
trials. 32 The Court stated: "Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to
3
constitute the crime with which he is charged., 1
Considering the Supreme Court's previous uncertainty regarding the
reasonable doubt standard, Winship set the High Court up for an

26. Id. at 440-41.
27. Such reluctance to provide a definition for reasonable doubt has persisted. See Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). Perhaps, in later cases, the Court's refusal to thoroughly
delve into the meaning of reasonable doubt was, in part, due to its failure at analyzing its sister
doctrine, the presumption of innocence. In Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-60 (1894),
the Court mischaracterized the presumption of innocence as a piece of defense evidence, an
"instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused." See id at 459. See also Sundby,
supra note 6, at 458, n.5.
28. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id. at364.
32. Id.
33. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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inevitable climb down. This retreat occurred in the cases determining the
scope of the reasonable doubt rule.3" Winship had commanded that
"every fact necessary to constitute the crime" be proven beyond
reasonable doubt." However, Winship left undecided which facts were
to be considered as "necessary to constitute a crime." Although the
subsequent "scope" cases which struggled with determining the
boundaries of the due process guarantee of the reasonable doubt rule
focused on an issue quite apart from the definition of reasonable doubt
itself, these decisions again illustrate the court's ambivalence toward the
reasonable doubt standard.
When Winship required the prosecution to prove every fact needed
for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, did it envision this to include
the grade of the offense? For instance, if the state has carried its burden
of proving that a defendant had committed a homicide, could the issue of
provocation, reducing murder to manslaughter, be shifted to the
defendant? The High Court, revealing its own indecision about the
reasonable doubt standard, answered this question with both a "yes" and
a "no" in the span of two years.
First, in the 1975 case of Mullaney v. Wilbur,3 6 the Court found
that such a burden shifting procedure required the defendant to disprove
the malice element of murder and thus, held that the procedure was
unconstitutional. Yet, in 1977, in Patterson v. New York," the Court
found a strikingly similar law to be constitutional because the state had
carried its full burden of proving murder (as more narrowly defined in
New York). Under New York's statutory scheme, provocation was seen
as an entirely separate "affirmative defense"3 8 which the defendant had
to prove. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Patterson approach a
decade later in Martin v. Ohio3 9 in the context of the affirmative defense
of self defense. Therefore, the due process issue in these cases seemed
to turn on how the state legislature defined its crimes and structured its
defenses. The obvious fear is that states, in an effort to ease their

34. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 36-39.
35. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
36. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
37. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
38. Id. at 206.
39. 480 U.S. 228 (1987). Commentators have both criticized and tried to make sense of various
aspects of the Supreme Court's reasoning on this issue. See Dripps, supra note 6; Sundby, supra
note 6; Note, supra note 14.
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procedural burdens in obtaining convictions, might circumvent much of
Winship's mandate by simply restructuring their criminal codes.
Thus, by both inaction and inconsistency, the Supreme Court has
created a knowledge vacuum surrounding a right so fundamental that it
must be guaranteed for every criminal trial. Ironically, in Jackson v.
Virginia,4 ° the Supreme Court declared, "The Winship doctrine requires
more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine establishing so fundamental
a substantive constitutional standard must also require that the factfinder
will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence."' Yet, the
Court's own ambivalence toward the reasonable doubt standard has left
lower courts with little guidance save the fact that virtually any
misstatement of the law may be cured by large doses of proper
instructions.
As a result, the reasonable doubt rule has been perverted into a
thoughtless ritual. Trial judges, receiving no guide posts from the
Supreme Court, have often allowed the rule to wither in their courtrooms
into little more than an incantation that magically increases in power
upon repetition. In United States v. Taylor,4 2 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a trial judge's charge to the
jury, because "the District Court instructed the jury no fewer than thirteen
times that the government was required to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact which supports our conclusion that the
instruction taken as a whole was not erroneous." '3
The force of repetition has not been lost on other courts.
"Numerous references" to proof beyond a reasonable doubt along with
"repeated direction" regarding the government's burden of proof have
saved charges to the jury. 4 Instructions have been found constitutional,
since "[t]he court emphasized, repeatedly that the government had the
burden of proof and also stressed that the presumption of innocence must
remain with the defendant throughout ...

the jury's deliberations.

'

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has expressed
concern that too much appellate court intervention may drive trial judges
"into a ritualistic recital of canned language that numbs the jury. 46
Ironically, however, the Supreme Court has achieved the same effect by
tilting toward the opposite extreme and providing no guidance.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

443 U.S. 307 (1978).
Id. at 316-17.
997 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1557 (citations omitted).
United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 10 (lst Cir. 1989).
United States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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For some courts, the shield of repetition may not provide enough
assurance. The void left by the Supreme Court has forced some appellate
courts to urge trial courts to simply dodge the issue entirely by not
defining reasonable doubt.47 With a nod to the Hopt Court,4" these
jurists defend their inaction with the internally inconsistent argument that
the reasonable doubt concept is both "self-defining" and yet vulnerable
to confusion of constitutional proportions if subjected to virtually any
judicial attempt at explanation.49 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has gone further and has declared that any
restatement of reasonable doubt is an effort to "express what is nearly
indefinable."5
The First Circuit Court of Appeals also has shown
timidity, suggesting that "it may be prudent on the part of a trial court to
consider seriously a defendant's request to define the concept only
minimally, or not at all."'"
The Supreme Court's consistent failure to fill the reasonable doubt
void has thus weakened this rule, because it has paralyzed the very
people called upon to implement it. One justice of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit baldly states the crux of the problem: "I find it
rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that we believe will
become less clear the more we explain it."52 Upon the realization that
the standard about which judges are becoming increasingly skittish is one
of due process that sets the standard for measuring the ultimate fact of
every criminal case, the problem becomes even more troubling.
III. The Supreme Court's Superficial Treatment of Reasonable Doubt
in Victor v. Nebraska Undermined Its Ability to Establish Any
Foundations for Future Courts
In 1993, when considering the constitutionality of the reasonable
doubt jury instructions before it, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit described the fork in the road at which reviewing courts
find themselves when examining such issues. The court noted, "We must
'tolerate a reasonable range of expression, some or even much of which
53
may not suit our fancy,' unless we impose pattern jury instructions.

47. One author lists the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits as jurisdictions that discourage
volunteering jury instructions defining reasonable doubt. Diamond, supra note 16, at 1719-20.
48. 120 U.S. 430 (1887); see supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
49. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 1719-20.
50. McGill v. United States, 348 F.2d 791, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also United States v.
Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
51. United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989).
52. Newman, supra note 19, at 984.
53. Watkins v. Ponte, 987 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1993).
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In Victor v. Nebraska,4 the Supreme Court apparently thought itself
faced with a similar choice. Yet, the Victor Court went even further by
taking such reasoning to its logical extreme. Victor seems to have framed
the Court's options in the starkest terms: either it run the risk of
violating the principles of federalism by imposing the equivalent of
pattern jury instructions on every state court in the nation,55 or it limit
itself to an ad hoc review of the semantics of any challenged reasonable
doubt phrase. A choice of such polar opposites paralyzed the court into
doing as little as possible in order to avoid even the appearance of
impinging upon state powers.
This action, or rather inaction, was not necessary. It is certainly
within the Court's power to provide a clear and rational foundation for
a rule of constitutional dimension. A full and reasoned analysis would
not usurp the states' role. On the contrary, it would provide a basis upon
which all courts could create their own rational and understandable
definitions of reasonable doubt.
The majority's opinion seems to break down into a string of separate
decisions regarding word choice. In selecting this approach, the High
Court has forgotten a basic axiom of law: Inaction in the face of duty is
itself action. The Court's refusal to adequately analyze the meaning of
reasonable doubt does not empower the state courts. Instead, it leaves
state judges and legislators uncertain about the purpose of reasonable
doubt. Unclear on the constitutional boundaries, courts will forego any
vigorous exercise of state power and instead cling to the rote phrases that
are already known to pass constitutional muster. Such hesitancy will
continue to reduce reasonable doubt to mere rhetoric.
A. The Court Minimized Its Role From the Outset, Thus Preventing a
Coherent Analysis of Reasonable Doubt
Starting in the second paragraph of the opinion, the majority aimed
to limit its review of the reasonable doubt issue presented in Victor.56

54. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
55. See id. at 1248.
56. The Victor Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of two "definitions" of
reasonable doubt. The first instruction reviewed by the Court reads as follows:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
Id. at 1244. The second instruction presented for the Court's review reads:

THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

Justice O'Connor began by noting that, although the reasonable doubt
rule is a requirement of due process, "the Constitution neither prohibits
trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as
a matter of course."57 While this is certainly true, it also suggests that
the Court may be less stringent in reviewing jury instructions, because it
is not assessing action mandated by the Constitution. Rather, the Court
is analyzing language volunteered arguably for the defendant's own
benefit. The Court bolstered this point by observing, "Indeed, so long as
the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that
any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the
government's burden of proof."58 This language signals the majority's
concern over finding itself in the position of drafting pattern jury
instructions. Yet, this overarching worry caused the Court to overcorrect
and thus, fail to provide any meaningful guidance to other courts.
The problem was amplified by Justice O'Connor's next statement.
She noted that rather than dissecting each word in isolation, the reviewing
court must instead require that, "'taken as a whole, the instructions [must]
correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury."'' 59 This
is, indeed, a well established rule. Yet its mention at the outset, and its
repeated use throughout the opinion, illustrated the Court's fear of
meaningfully approaching the reasonable doubt issue head on. In fact,
the majority referenced the curative powers of context over a dozen times
in a twenty page opinion, essentially creating a kind of legal mantra.60

"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent
person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause
and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting
thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial
consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time, absolute or
mathematical certainty is not required. You may be convinced of the truth of
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly you may
be mistaken. You may find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities
of the case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt
of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actualandsubstantial
doubt arising from the evidence, from the facts or circumstances shown by the
evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the state, as distinguished
from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from
fanciful conjecture.
Id. at 1249.
57. Id. at 1243.
58. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
59. Id. (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
60. Context was directly mentioned or alluded to in the following portions of the majority
opinion: (1) "Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of
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Ultimately, the Court's message is that virtually any misstatement
may be saved if surrounded by enough proper language. By giving
surrounding language such broad curative powers, the very analysis of
improper wording loses its import. Lower courts may even be lulled into
a false sense of security that any improper language may be merely
drowned out by surrounding constitutional statements of law. Curiously
enough, the entire "contextual" argument presupposes that juries will
properly choose valid language to cure the invalid statements of law.
However, by relying so frequently on this approach, the Court runs the
risk that jurors may be just as reasonably likely to "cure" good law with
bad.
The Victor majority also noted that finding reasonable doubt
instructions to be unconstitutional is a rare event. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that a set of reasonable doubt instructions violated due
process only once. 6 This comment's only relevance to the Victor

reasonable doubt to the jury."' Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243; (2) The phrase "moral evidence" is not
fatal, in part, because "... the instruction itself gives a definition of the phrase." Id.at 1246; (3)
"Moral evidence" is saved by "other instructions given in Sandoval's case." Id.; (4) "Although in this
respect moral certainty is ambiguous in the abstract, the rest of the instruction given in Sandoval's
case lends content to the phrase." Id.at 1247; (5) "But the moral certainty language cannot be
sequestered from its surroundings." Id.at 1248; (6) "[Alnd in the context of the instructions as a
whole we cannot say that the use of the phrase rendered the instruction given in Sandoval's case
unconstitutional." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248; (7) "That this is the sense in which the instruction
uses 'possible' is made clear from the final phrase of the sentence, which notes that everything 'is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt."' Id.at 1248-49; (8) "Any ambiguity, however, is
removed by reading the phrase in the context of the sentence in which it appears ....
" Id.at 1250;
(9) "In the instruction given in Victor's case, the context makes clear that 'substantial' is used in the
sense of existence rather than magnitude of the doubt, so the same concern is not present." Id.; (10)
In any event, the instruction provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt ...." Id. (11)
"[T]he problem in Cage was that the rest of the instruction provided insufficient context to lend
meaning to the phrase." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250; (12) "But in the same sentence..." Id.at 1251;
(13) "'[T]aken as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury' Id. at 1251.
To say that frequent mention of context by itself is fatal to the majority's analysis is obviously
unfair. Rather, it is the majority's emphasis on the potency of adjacent words that causes concern.
Justice Blackmun noted this problem when asserting:
But even assuming this "hesitate to act" language is in some way helpful to a jury in
understanding the meaning of reasonable doubt, the existence of an "alternative" and
accurate definition of reasonable doubt somewhere in the instruction does not render the
instruction lawful if it is "reasonably likely" that the jury would rely on the faulty
definition during its deliberations. Cage itself contained proper statements of the law with
respect to what is required to convict or acquit a defendant, but this language could not
salvage the instruction since it remained reasonably likely that, despite the proper
statements of law, the jury understood the instruction to require "a higher degree of doubt
than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard."
Id. at 1257 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
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analysis could be in highlighting the heavy burden borne by the party
challenging the constitutionality of reasonable doubt instructions.
Finally, the Victor Court announced that it would judge the
instructions before it by determining "whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction
based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." ' 2 This is
indeed the test by which reasonable doubt jury instructions are to be
measured.6 a However, the Victor majority seemed to diminish the
reasonable likelihood threshold in order to ease the government's burden.
This was done in part by contrasting reasonable likelihood with the
previously used, and more demanding, test of whether an instruction
"'could have' been applied" in an unconstitutional manner.' At various
places in the opinion, Justice O'Connor held that although certain of
Victor's and Sandoval's instructions might be flawed, they were not so
improper as to make it reasonably likely that jurors would misapply the
65
law.
The Court's repeated acceptance of imperfect language is not alone
significant. However, the pattern the majority established with its
combination of lenient measures is alarming. For instance, when Justice
O'Connor continually salvaged vague language by placing it in a larger
context and then declared it sufficient to meet the reasonable likelihood

61. Id. at 1243 (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990)). However, even the Cage
instruction itself might have been revived by the context cure. Id. at 1250. Justice O'Connor
asserted that "the problem in Cage was that the rest of the instruction provided insufficient context
to lend meaning to the phrase." Id
In Cage, the jurors were instructed that a reasonable doubt is:
one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and
conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your
mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a
doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute
or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
62. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
63. In previous decisions, the Supreme Court had explicitly approved the "reasonable
likelihood" test as the standard of review for challenged instructions. See Boyde v. California, 494
U.S. 370 (1989). The Boyde Court noted, "We think the proper inquiry in such a case is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380. See also Estelle v.
McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 n.4 (1991). The Estelle Court disapproved the "could have
interpreted" standard of Cage v. Louisiana, stating, "In Boyde, however, we made it a point to settle
on a single standard of review for jury instructions-the "reasonable likelihood" standard-after
considering the many different phrasings that had previously been used by this Court." Id.
64. Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1243.
65. Id.at 1248, 1250, 1251.
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standard,66 this process cast doubt on the very meaning of the reasonable
likelihood test itself. Thus, the manner in which the Victor majority both
characterized and applied the reasonable likelihood standard tilted this
standard in the prosecution's favor.
This is of particular interest since when the Court originally created
the reasonable likelihood rule, it did not do so to lessen the government's
burden, but to promote "finality and accuracy" by avoiding inquiries into
what hypothetical reasonable jurors could or might do.67 In fact, the
Boyde Court even conceded that "there may not be great differences"
among the various formulations then used to test jury instructions.6"
The importance of choosing among the several phrases was to settle upon
a "single formulation" for all courts to employ in uniform fashion.6"
Justice O'Connor's reduced "reasonable likelihood" standard also
stood in marked contrast to Justice Blackmun's view of this threshold.
Justice Blackmun noted,
It is not sufficient for the jury instruction merely to be susceptible to
an interpretation that is technically correct. The important question
is whether there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the jury was misled
or confused by the instruction, and therefore applied it in a way that
violated the Constitution.7 °
Victor thus leaves us with two contradictory pictures of reasonable
likelihood: Justice O'Connor's permissive view, which emphasizes that
it may not be reasonably likely that jurors will be misled by even
significant misstatements of the law, and Justice Blackmun's stricter
perspective that it may be reasonably likely that jurors will be confused
by even technically correct instructions. Justice O'Connor's view may
have carried a majority in Victor. However, Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of "reasonable likelihood" has not gained unanimous
support among the current Justices 7 and similar interpretations had been
rejected by Justices in prior terms. 2
Ultimately, by establishing a series of limits on its own analysis at
the very outset, the Victor majority set the stage to water down its
scrutiny of the challenged instructions. Such an approach enabled the
Court to give a relatively surface linguistic treatment to a handful of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 379-80.
Id.
Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1254.
See infra text accompanying note 70.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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challenged phrases rather than a probing and enlightening analysis of core
issues.
B. The Victor Court StructuredIts Opinion as a Series of Rebuttals to
Each Defense Argument, Creatinga List of Ad Hoc Rulings and
Causing a Guidance Vacuum
After establishing a deferential standard of review, Justice O'Connor
provided no conceptual basis for the majority's subsequent discussion of
reasonable doubt. Instead, after a summary of facts and a review of the
procedural posture of the cases at bench, the Court merely took the
arguments advanced by the two defendants in turn. Therefore, rather
than having an opinion structured by the constitutional theories
undergirding the reasonable doubt standard, the opinion is molded
entirely by the litigant's briefs.
Prior Supreme Court opinions stand in marked contrast to the
majority's reactive posture. In Jackson v. Virginia," the Court quoted
both the majority and concurring opinions in Winship in detailing the
rationales behind the reasonable doubt standard:
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, said the Court,
"plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure,"
because it operates to give "concrete substance" to the presumption of
innocence, to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk
of factual error in a criminal proceeding. At the same time, by
impressing upon the fact finder the need to reach a subjective state of
near certitude of guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the
significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus
to liberty itself.74
Such an inquiry into the meaning and purpose of reasonable doubt is
simply absent in Victor. The consequences of this inaction will be a
continued undermining of the reasonable doubt standard. Further,
without a definition receiving reasoned constitutional buttressing,
unguided courts will drift among a series of unsatisfactory phrases.

73.
74.

443 U.S. 307 (1978).
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
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IV. Concerns Raised by the Court's Failure of Direction
A. In Upholding the Use of "MoralCertainty,"the Court Handed
Californiaa Pyrrhic Victory
The Justices in Victor unanimously recognized that California's use
of the term "moral certainty" was erroneous. The harshest, albeit
somewhat indirect, criticism may have been meted out by Justice
Kennedy. He took the trouble to write a separate opinion in order to
specifically target California's reliance on the terms "moral certainty" and
"moral evidence." Justice Kennedy wrote,
Though the reference to "moral certainty" is not much better,
California's use of "moral evidence" is the most troubling, and to me
seems quite indefensible. The derivation of the phrase is explained
in the Court's opinion, but even with this help the term is a puzzle.
And for jurors who have not had the benefit of the Court's research,
the words will do nothing but baffle.75
Justice Kennedy concluded his thoughts by noting, "The inclusion of
words so malleable because so obscure, might in other circumstances
have put the whole instruction at risk."76
Justice Kennedy was alluding to the fact that the terms moral
certainty and moral evidence are products of earlier centuries." Such
words may indeed have lost their original meaning with contemporary
jurors. Without guidance, juries may improperly distort these archaic
phrases and thus, improperly apply the reasonable doubt standard. After
all, presented with obscure language lacking modem explanation and a
mandate to act, jurors may, by necessity, mold moral certainty and moral
evidence into their own ideas of what these phrases should mean. These
ideas, divorced from any understanding of historical context, may be a far
cry from the notions about certainty of knowledge originally formed
beginning in the 17th century. The majority, as it had to, conceded the
existence of this danger:
We are somewhat more concerned . . . that the phrase "moral
certainty" has lost its historical meaning, and that a modem jury
would understand it to allow conviction on proof that does not meet
the beyond the reasonable doubt standard. Words and phrases can

75. Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Id.at 1245. The majority traced the origin of "moral evidence" to "the philosophers and
historians of the 17th and 18th centuries" and discussed the use of this language in the "19th
century." Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 18.
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change meaning over time: a passage generally understood in 1850
may be incomprehensible or confusing to a modem juror.7"
Regardless, the Court neither adequately addressed the full
ramifications of this problem nor offered a credible solution. The
concern presented by moral certainty is not merely that the jurors might
apply a standard less than that of reasonable doubt. The true worry is
that such an obscure phrase opens up a variety of incorrect choices for
jurors: the government's burden may be impermissibly lowered, raised,
or substituted by a juror's own standards of certainty. With such a
"malleable" phrase, there is no guarantee that all the jurors in one
deliberation room will even be applying the same standard.
The moral certainty definition may lower the proper level of
persuasion, because it could tempt jurors to convict a defendant on other
than evidentiary grounds. This was the essence of one of the arguments
advanced by Mr. Sandoval, the defendant in Sandoval v. California,a
companion case to Victor.7 9 After all, the word "moral" could signal
jurors to abandon the legal rules in favor of their inner sense of right and
wrong. If the jurors felt certain, on some moral level, that the defendant
violated the law, their own sense of morals may mandate that the accused
receive punishment regardless of the reasonable doubt standard. Mr.
Sandoval also argued that, since many contemporary dictionaries define
moral certainty in terms of "probability," jurors may equate moral
certainty with "probability."8
Additionally, even without these other
concerns, jurors may feel the moral need to convict if they perceive the
defendant to be a bad or immoral person, despite the technical
requirements of the formal charges involved.
In contrast, certainty might cause some juries to impermissibly raise
the government's burden of persuasion. In fact, the moral certainty
formulation might even send to today's jurors the exact opposite message
that it was designed to convey to 18th and 19th century fact finders. To
18th century minds, "moral evidence" had a very specific meaning. All
evidence could be divided into two categories: "moral evidence" and

78. Id. at 1247. Justice O'Connor's choice here of"1850" is of particular interest because she

selected virtually the most recent date of use and thus, may have been de-emphasizing the fact that
this term has much older origins. See Shapiro, supra note 18.
79. Justice O'Connor characterized this argument as follows:
"Accepting that the instruction requires a high level of confidence inthe defendant's guilt, Sandoval
argues that a juror might be convinced to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty even though
the government has failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 124748.
80. Id. at 1247.
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"demonstrative evidence."'" Demonstrative evidence was the more
absolute of the two kinds of proof, dealing with "'abstract and necessary
truths, or the unchangeable relations of ideas."'8 2 Alternatively, moral
evidence focused on "'the real but contingent truths and connections,
which take place among things actually existing."' 83 Since demonstrative
reasoning and evidence considered the realm of the absolute,
contradictions were impossible.8 4 On the other hand, the whole thrust
of moral evidence was that it was of the real world. Therefore, "'[i]n
moral evidence, there not only may be, but there generally is, contrariety
of proofs: in demonstrative evidence, no such contrariety can take
place."' 8 5 Thus, advising 18th century jurors that they were to weigh
moral evidence was to warn them that they were to make decisions in the
messy universe of ordinary life. Justice O'Connor, quoting a leading 19th
century treatise, noted that "[m]atters of fact are proved by moral
evidence alone; . . . In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require
demonstrative evidence,... and to insist upon it would be unreasonable
and absurd." 6
Perhaps the most telling aspect of moral evidence was that its most
important source was testimony.87 Of course, testimony could be
imperfect or even false. Indeed, it could be contradicted by still other
testimony. A 19th century legal treatise even offered reasons for
questioning testimony offered in court.8 8 It is in this context of the
imperfection of the knowledge of human affairs that moral evidence
operated. Thus, in weighing the human facts of guilt or innocence, the
highest degree of certainty which could be attained from this moral
evidence was "moral certainty." 89
Unaware of the philosophical distinction between moral certainty and
the more rigorous standard of "demonstrable certainty," jurors might
attribute to "moral certainty" a meaning more closely akin to the absolute
proof required in situations involving demonstrable certainty. When
courts present jurors with the term "moral certainty" and do not provide

81. Id. at 1245. See also 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 505, 518 (J. Andrews ed. 1896);
Shapiro supra note 18, at 177-79.
82. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1245 (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 505, 518 (J. Andrews
ed. 1896)).
83. Id.

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
Andrews
89.

Id.
Id. (citing S. Greenleaf, LAw OF EVIDENCE 3-4 (13th ed. (1876)).
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 177-79.
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 177-79 (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 505 (J.
ed. 1896)).
Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1245.
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any explicit definition of the phrase, jurors might assume two things:
(1) moral certainty must have some meaning of independent significance,
otherwise the judge would not waste her breath in saying it, and
(2) moral certainty must be subject to our common understanding,
otherwise the judge would have explained it as she has every other word
which needed definition.
Then, in an attempt to make sense of moral certainty, the jury might
break down the phrase into its more familiar component parts. Some
90
courts have suggested this for the very phrase "reasonable doubt.
"Moral" may be equated in jurors' minds with morality, a word typically
used for such absolute concepts as good versus evil. Moral issues, by
definition, have no middle ground; either one does the moral act or he
does not.9 When jurors turn their attention to "certainty," they might
think of this term as describing a state of mind of being so sure of a fact
as to lack any doubt.92 Thus, when these two words are recombined in
the jurors' minds, they may elevate the government's burden to a
virtually unattainable threshold of absolute certainty. In the short term,
this will undermine the careful balance to be struck by the reasonable
doubt standard. 93 In the long run, it may so erode public confidence in
the criminal justice system that some jurors may be tempted to fashion
their own, less stringent, standards for conviction. The result would be

90. See United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1993)("The terms 'reasonable'
and 'doubt' are as accessible to laymen as they are to experts.").
91. In borrowing one of the majority's tools of analysis, we turn to a dictionary definition of
one of the contested words. The first definition of the word "moral" is: "I a: of or relating to
principles of right and wrong in behavior: ETHICAL..." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 756 (10th ed. 1993). A definition referring to the level of certainty is only arrived at
in the second definition. Interestingly, this description of certainty falls far short of the eighteenth
century level of knowledge conveyed by "moral certainty". The dictionary provides: "2: probable
though not proved: VIRTUAL..." Id. The entire thrust of moral certainty is the description of that
threshold of certainty needed to be attained in order to conclude a fact is proven. Of course, much
effort is spent in the majority opinion to distinguish the challenged instructions from mere
probability. See Victor, 114 S.CL at 1247.
92. Synonyms for certainty include, "CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE, CONVICTION mean a state
of being freefrom doubt. CERTAINTY and CERTITUDE are very close; CERTAINTY may stress
the existence of objective proof <claims that cannot be confirmed with scientific certainty>, while
CERTITUDE may emphasize a faith in something not leading or not capable of proof<believes with
certitude in an afterlife>..." MERRIAM WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 187 (10th ed. 1993)
(emphasis added). Being free from doubt clearly exceeds the government's burden and directly
contradicts the remainder of the reasonable doubt instruction, obviously risking jury confusion.
93. See In Re Winship 397 U.S. at 370-72 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan characterized
the reasonable doubt standard as a balancing of certain societal costs. In particular, Justice Harlan
noted, "I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372.

99

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING 1995

an undermining of the reasonable doubt standard and possibly of the
presumption of innocence itself.
Of course, the moral certainty definition may neither directly lower
nor raise the reasonable doubt threshold; it may merely cloud it. It could
strike the jury as merely a legalistic redundancy like the phrase, "Please
'
provide a full and complete answer."94
On the other hand, because
jurors are unfamiliar with the language, they may gloss over it during
their deliberations. Here, moral certainty is at best a phrase meaning
either nothing at all or something that can simply be ignored. The mere
fact that it may not cause harm is hardly a credible endorsement for its
continued use.
If such language is vulnerable to a great variety of misapplications,
any solution from the court must at the outset at least recognize each of
these improper possibilities. Instead, the Victor Court narrowed its focus
of moral certainty's adverse effects to only those which may lower the
standard.9" Thereafter, it rejected even this single concern by arguing
that today's jurors are reasonably likely to apply moral certainty as the
equivalent of reasonable doubt.
The Victor majority conceded that the moral certainty formulation
suffered certain obvious failings. Indeed, at least to some degree, the
Court recognized the remoteness of the moral certainty/moral evidence
lexicon. Since, as previously indicated, "[m]oral certainty was the
' for juries
highest degree of certitude based on such [moral] evidence,"96
to adequately understand moral certainty, they needed to comprehend
moral evidence. Yet Justice O'Connor noted: "We recognize that the
phrase 'moral evidence' is not a mainstay of the modem lexicon, though
we do not think it means anything different today than it did in the 19th

94.

See Shapiro, supra note 18. Dr. Shapiro provides the following candid view of "moral

certainty":
Because it troubles us that "beyond a reasonable doubt" conveys no very precise meaning,
we add a second phrase, "to a moral certainty," but it conveys even less meaning and
makes our whole problem worse. Only a few quite well-educated older people who have
read a great deal of nineteenth-century literature are likely even to have said, "I am
morally certain that you left your coat in the restaurant" or "Are you morally certain that
you came into the room before she did?" It is the kind of phrase that a screenwriter
might put in the mouth of a country storekeeper to suggest a slightly bookish, straightlaced, religious old man still living in an earlier age. Even those few people who might
use the phrase would be using the word "moral" as a kind of pretentious substitute for
"very." If most of us understand the question "Are you morally certain?" at all, we
understand it as "Are you very certain?"
Id.
95. Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1247.
96. Id. at 1245. Justice O'Connor also noted, "The phrase 'moral certainty' shares an
epistemological pedigree with moral evidence." Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 18.

THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

century. The few contemporary dictionaries that define moral evidence
do so consistently with its original meaning."9' 7 However, what is more
relevant to probing jury comprehension is not that some dictionaries may
include a 19th century definition of moral evidence, but the fact thatfew
dictionaries bother to define the term at all. After all, if the point the
majority is straining to make is that moral evidence has the same meaning
to 21st century jurors that it did to 19th century jurors, than the
dwindling references in modem dictionaries is weak proof indeed.
Besides, the reliance on dictionaries in this context is artificial.
Jurors are not themselves walking dictionaries, certainly not of 19th
century terms. Furthermore, this is a discussion regarding language in
jury instructions. These instructions, by themselves, are supposed to fully
define the law in a form in which lay people can understand and use.
The entire purpose of jury instructions is to provide a complete and selfcontained statement of law upon which jurors can reach a reasoned
decision as to the facts. 98
The Court's main response to the confusion that the terms "moral
evidence" and "moral certainty" generate was to explain these phrases
with adjacent language. According to the Court, each concern, whether
it is the archaic and confusing nature of moral evidence, the murkiness
of moral certainty, the definitions equating moral certainty with
probability, or the tendency of moral certainty to invite jurors to convict
on belief rather than evidence, is overcome by reference to the
surrounding terms. 99
Another approach explored by the majority is a historical analysis of
moral certainty and moral evidence. Justice O'Connor suggests, "some
understanding of the historical context in which that instruction [moral
evidence and moral certainty] was written is accordingly helpful in
evaluating its continued validity."'" Yet, the reasons for this line of
inquiry are not fully clear. If the Court is concerned with how these
terms are understood by juries in 1994, a review of events beyond the
ordinary citizen's knowledge is of marginal help. Our criminal justice
system is based on the premise that most jurors will be lay people and

97. Id. at 1246.
98. If the continual references to dictionaries implies that jurors could simply find explanations
of these terms in an ordinary dictionary, such a practice is specifically forbidden in California. Jurors
are charged, in California Civil Jury Instruction 1.03, as follows: "[You] must not make ...
information." "[You] must not make any independent investigation of the facts or the law or
consider or discuss facts as to which there is no evidence. This means ...
that you must not on your
own ...
consult reference works or persons for additional information." CALJIC, 1.03 (5th ed. 1988).
99. Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1246-48.
100. Id. at 1245.
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thus, provide a buffer between the accused and the machinery of the
state. These jurors are not expected to know the present law (hence the
need for jury instructions), let alone that formulated and used in the 18th
and 19th centuries. As previously noted, the majority has even conceded
this.' 0 '
Therefore, the only legitimate reason for delving into the past is to
determine the initial purpose of such phrases like moral certainty and to
fully analyze whether the original goals of the reasonable doubt standard
are still being carried out by these terms. The High Court has pursued
this type of inquiry many times with a variety of constitutional rights, not
to freeze the law into archaic terminology, but to ensure that the law
02
keeps pace with society in order to guarantee constitutional rights.
This is what the Victor opinions lack. The Victor Court missed its
opportunity to update the reasonable doubt standard when the Court
allowed the litigant's briefs to structure their opinion and relied on
context as a cure-all.
Victor's approach in affirming moral certainty merely deepens the
confusion troubling California courts. Victor spares no feelings in
criticizing moral certainty and moral evidence." 3 Yet, the Court
scraped together enough proper context to enable it to uphold the
constitutionality of these terms. Thus, after a history of agonizing over
this terminology,'0 4 the State of California is provided with a series of
reasons explaining the flaws of their definition, without any meaningful
guidance providing a basis for improvement. Certainly, California is not
helpless and, of course, jealously protects its states rights. Arguably, the
State would even welcome the opportunity to redefine its own reasonable
doubt standard. However, the Court's ad hoc opinion has left California
in the dark, giving no reasoned foundation on which to build.
B. The Questionable Status of Other CurrentDefinitions
When the Victor majority chose to assess each definition of
reasonable doubt on a word-by-word basis by measuring the challenged

101. Id. at 1247.
102. Constitutional criminal procedure has been built on such opinions. Obvious examples
include Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Supreme Court continues this practice to the present day.
For instance, in 1993, the Court defined the scope of the Fourth Amendment in Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
103. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248.
104. See People v. Brigham, 599 P.2d 100, 106-21 (1979). See also Alternative Definitions of
Reasonable Doubt: A Report of the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal to the
California Legislature (May 22 1987).
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phrase against each Justice's personal sense of reasonable doubt, the
Court caused every definition to become vulnerable to attack. Any
language chosen should be meaningfully anchored to the original
purposes underlying the reasonable doubt rule to withstand constitutional
challenge. Otherwise, any phrase can be discarded as easily as it was
adopted. The unhappy result of Victor's approach is that virtually every
definition might attract the wrath of some Supreme Court Justice. In this
regard, the criticisms launched at some of the currently used definitions
are illuminating.
1. Hesitate To Act.-The Victor Court did support one reasonable
doubt formulation: 'Reasonable doubt' is such a doubt as would cause
a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important
transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented
facts as true and relying and acting thereon."' 5 In fact, the Court
found the existence of this language sufficient to cure other "somewhat
problematic" wording in the instructions." 6 Justice O'Connor noted
that "a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act" has
been "repeatedly approved"'0 7 by the high court, as it provides "a
common-sense benchmark for just how substantial such a doubt must
° Justice O'Connor did not elaborate about why "hesitate to act"
be."'O
tapped into the jury's common sense. This gap in reasoning was
particularly unfortunate in light of the concerns raised by Justices
Ginsburg and Blackmun.
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg described "hesitate to act" as
"unhelpful" and then proceeded to pinpoint specific flaws in this
language. Noting that the "hesitate to act" analogy was misplaced, Justice
Ginsburg cited the criticism of a Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee:
In the decisions people make in the most important of their own
affairs, resolution of conflicts about past events does not usually play
a major role. Indeed, decisions we make in the most important affairs
of our lives--choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the
like-generally involve a very heavy element of uncertainty and risktaking. They are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in
criminal cases.' 0 9

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1249.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Two separate problems are mentioned in this passage. First, the
"hesitate to act" charge advises juries to apply a future-oriented decisionmaking process which normally deals with events beyond their present
knowledge to determine matters in court dealing with past events. There
is a difference. The structure of a trial implies to the jurors that they will
receive sufficient information, in the form of presently available evidence,
to make their decision of guilt or innocence. Yet, as jurors lives are
formed, few major life events can be decided with the luxury of
possessing all the facts necessary for the decision. Thus, risk taking
becomes a necessary part of daily decisions."' Secondly, the important
decisions in a person's life usually are the most personal. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg lists among them choosing a spouse and a job. Such decisions
are made in a context completely foreign to the courtroom. A person
may reach these decisions not by deliberating with others, but by
individual reflection. If life choices are mentioned to others, it is
typically to close friends or even family, rather than twelve strangers
whose only connection to the decision maker is the task of reaching a
verdict. Finally, spouses and careers are chosen in large measure by
reliance on emotion, a part of the human condition that judges try to limit
in the deliberation room."'
Moreover, the courtroom experience may distort jurors' sense of
"hesitation." Generally, jurors automatically hesitate during deliberations,
pausing to consider evidence or to listen a fellow juror. This serious
purpose contrasts sharply with how jurors think of "hesitation" in other
contexts where a larger stimulus might be necessary in order to slow their
decision-making. This is not merely because jurors are placed in the
unfamiliar setting of a panelled courtroom with judicial robes and court
reporters. It is also because they are placed in an unnatural mind set.
The very reasonable doult instructions jurors hear may include warnings
to avoid rushing to hardened opinions or to ignore testimony heard that
was later stricken from the record."'
Such charges ask jurors to

110. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1257 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
i 1. For example, California jurors are instructed,in part: "You must not be influenced by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." CAUIC 1.00
(5th ed. 1988).
112. In California, jurors are charged:
The attitude and conduct of jurors at all times are very important. It is rarely helpfulfor
a juror at the beginning of deliberationsto express an emphatic opinion on the case or
to announce a determination to standfor a certain verdict. When one does that at the
outset, a sense of pride may be aroused, and one may hesitate to change a position even
if shown it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter.
You are impartial judges of the facts.
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behave contrary to their usual tendencies. Further, the very concept of
deliberation, of being deliberate, is to slow the mind from reaching a
conclusion too quickly. In this situation, jurors may be confused as to
what degree of pause constitutes "hesitation."
Finally, there is the issue of what jurors are expected to do once they
"hesitate." If indeed they reach such an event and recognize its existence,
what then? "Should they decline to convict because they have reached
a point of hesitation, or should they simply hesitate, then ask themselves
whether, in their own private matters, they would resolve the doubt in
favor of action, and, if so, continue on to convict?""' 3
Thus, even the language that the Court held to be an example of
clear, common sensical, and accurate instructions is vulnerable to
significant criticisms. This is due to the fact that the Victor majority
favored hesitate to act, not because it fulfilled fundamental goals of the
reasonable doubt standard, but because it best matched the subjective
taste of certain Justices. Any formulation, with the current dearth of
reasoning regarding the fundamental meaning and purpose of reasonable
doubt, will similarly fail.
2. Substantial Doubt.-In Cage v. Louisiana,"4 the Supreme
Court summarily rejected an "actual substantial doubt" definition of
reasonable doubt. The Court stated,
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are
commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When
those statements are then considered with reference to "moral
certainty," rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a
finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the
Due Process Clause." 5
However, in the brief span of four years, what was once "clear" to
the Supreme Court has now suddenly become complex. Substantial
doubt, flatly condemned by the Court in Cage and uniformly disapproved
by the courts of appeals" 6 is now only "somewhat problematic."" 7

CAUIC 17.41 (5th ed. 1988) (emphasis added). Further, jurors are also instructed: "Do not
consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was stricken by the court; treat it as though you
had never heard of it." Id.§ 1.02.
113. Newman, supra note 19, at 983.
114. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
115. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
116. Victor, 114 S.Ct. at 1256-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Smith v.
Bordenkircher, 718 F. 2d 1273, 1276 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting the "'uniformly disapproving' view of
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In 1990, the Court felt that the "actual substantial doubt" phrase
"plain[ly]" suggested "a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.""'
However, in 1994,
the phrase is capable of two meanings: (1) "not seeming or imaginary,"
and (2) "that specified to a large degree." ' 9 The Victor majority
resolved this newfound quandary with its "context cure." Once again, the
Court determined that a definition was not merely constitutional or
unconstitutional. Rather, each "substantial doubt" formulation rose or fell
on a case-by-case basis. According to Victor, Cage's"substantial doubt"
was constitutionally faulty merely because it was not cocooned in
context. 2 ° Victor's "substantial doubt" survived scrutiny because, "the
context makes clear that 'substantial' is used in the sense of existence
rather than magnitude of the doubt, so the same concern is not
present."''
Once again, Justice O'Connor's situational analysis saps
Victor's holding of any potential to guide future courts. Additional
litigation over which "substantial doubt" phrases are cured by context and
which are not is assured by the majority's ad hoc approach.
The Court's selective reading of the original Cage instruction creates
further confusion. As noted by Justice Blackmun, the majority made
several distinctions between the charges in Cage and Victor when in
reality no real differences existed.'
Perhaps the most glaring example
involves the majority's attempt to salvage "substantial doubt" by
perceiving it as nothing more than an effort to distance reasonable doubt
from any doubt. In this vein, Justice O'Connor quoted the language
surrounding "substantial doubt": "'A reasonable doubt is an actual and
substantial doubt . . . as distinguishedfrom a doubt arising from mere
possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture."" 23
Justice O'Connor then asserted that "[t]his explicit distinction between a
substantial doubt and a fanciful conjecture was not present in the Cage
instruction.' ' 24 However, this statement is only accurate in the sense
that the Cage instruction did not make this distinction in the same
sentence as its mention of "substantial doubt." Yet, if we are to follow

the appellate courts regarding the use of the 'substantial doubt' language.").
117. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250.
118. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
119. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2280 (unabridged 1981)).
120. Id. at 1280.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1255-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
123. Id. at 1250.
124. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250.
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the majority's oft repeated rule of reading words in their full context, the
majority would have to acknowledge the language found in the very same
paragraph as Cage's "substantial doubt" instruction. According to the
instruction struck down in Cage, reasonable doubt must be "a reasonable
one; that is one founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not
upon mere caprice and conjecture . . . A reasonable
doubt is not mere
' 25
possible doubt. It is an actual substantialdoubt.'
Thus, as Justice Blackmun forcefully noted, the absence of
contrasting language could not be the fatal flaw of the Cage instruction,
because the Cage Court did indeed include ample language employing
"substantial doubt" as a way of differentiating "reasonable" from "any"1
doubt. 26 In fact, both the Cage and Victor instructions distinguished
the word "substantial" from mere "caprice and conjecture."' 27 Thus, an
analysis truly considering the full context would find that the Victor and
Cage instructions ultimately convey the same distinction between
reasonable and fanciful doubt.
The Victor Court further obscured the constitutional status of
substantial doubt by viewing Cage's use of this language as being
somehow inextricably intertwined with "grave uncertainty.'121 Yet the
Cage Court, in simply stating that "[i]t is plain to us that the words
'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a
higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal,"' 29 held that either
phrase, in conjunction with the troubled words "moral certainty"
overstated the requisite doubt to avoid conviction. 3 '
However, in an attempt to resurrect substantial doubt in Victor,
Justice O'Connor interpreted these terms "in parallel," limiting the Cage
holding regarding "substantial doubt" to instances in which this phrase is
preceded by a reference to grave uncertainty.'
The court has therefore
firmly fixed substantial doubt in a state of limbo, to be considered proper

125. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
126. Justice Blackmun concluded,
Thus, the reason the Court condemned the 'substantial doubt' language in Cage had
nothing to do with the absence of appropriate contrasting language; rather, the Court
condemned the language for precisely the reason it gave: "mhe words 'substantial' and
'grave' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard."
Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. Id. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. Id. at 1250.
129. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
130. Id.
131. Victor, 114 s. Ct. at 1250.
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or improper only after testing it by an increasingly baroque formula
involving moral certainty and grave uncertainty.
3. Strong Probabilities.-Noneof the Justices vigorously advocated
the "strong probabilities" formulation of reasonable doubt. Justice
Blackmun labeled "strong probabilities" as misleading.'
Justice
Ginsburg went so far as to charge that such language either understated
the government's burden 33 or was essentially meaningless due to
"uninstructive circularity."'1
Yet, perhaps the most telling illustration of the problems surrounding
the strong probabilities formulation was the majority's defense of its use
in the Victor instructions. According to the majority, the phrase "strong
probabilities" was not constitutionally defective in Victor, because it was
saved by the very words it was supposed to define. Holding that the
instruction before it was constitutionally sound, the Court noted that
"Victor argues that the reference to 'strong probabilities' in the instruction
unconstitutionally understated the government's burden. But in the same
sentence,the instruction informs the jury that the probabilities must be
strong enough to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 34 Under this reasoning, if the trial court somehow links the
"strong possibilities" language to the words "reasonable doubt," the Court
may find that the reasonable doubt reference sanitizes the improper
"strong possibilities" phrase rather than that phrase tainting the meaning
of reasonable doubt. Thus, yet another poorly written definition remains
to obscure the reasonable doubt threshold.
4. Firmly Convinced andReal Possibility.-After agreeing with the
majority's criticism regarding "moral certainty" and expressing
dissatisfaction with the "hesitate to act" and "doubt . . . that is
reasonable" standards, Justice Ginsburg offered a model instruction
centered around the terms "firmly convinced" and "real possibility."' 35

132. Id. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1251.
135. The suggested instruction provides:
[T]he government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that
it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal
cases, the government's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
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However, as with every instruction in this confused area of law, the
firmly convinced/real possibility formulation suffers from uncertain
acceptance.
In United States v. Porter,'36 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
actually offered "real possibility" as an example of the dangers inherent
in attempting to provide a definition for reasonable doubt.'37 The
Portercourt feared that "[i]mplying that the evidence must show a real
possibility of innocence to justify acquittal trenches on the principle that
a defendant is presumed to be innocent."' 38 Although ultimately
upholding the instruction, Porter questioned how the trial court could
believe that a jury would understand "real possibility" and yet need
assistance in understanding "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 39
V. Conclusion
Two centuries after its first known mention in a criminal court,140
the Unided States Supreme Court recognized the reasonable doubt
standard of persuasion as a fundamental right of due process. 4 ' Yet,
to be more than just a hollow rule, reasonable doubt must be vigorously
and consistently applied in every criminal case. This simply will not
occur if lay people are called upon to implement a law which mystifies
even judges.
The reasonable doubt standard is unique among constitutional rights,
because it is truly central to every criminal trial. This is the standard by
which the fact finder determines the ultimate fact: the defendant's guilt
or innocence. Every word of testimony spoken by a witness, every
physical exhibit offered in the courtroom, and every document admitted
into evidence is measured by this standard. Because the reasonable doubt
rule is so important in all criminal trials, it should be bolstered by the
clearest of definitions.
Further, reasonable doubt is a rule of law that is to be applied by
juries at least as much as by the judiciary. Thus, lay people with widely

that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the
other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him
the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty."
Id.at 1253 (citing Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (1987)
(Instruction 21)).
136. 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987).
137. Id. at 973.
138. Id. See also United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (articulating concern
that the "real possibility" standard causes impermissible burden shifting).
139. Id.
140. See Morano, supra note 12, at 519.
141. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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varied backgrounds and philosophies will be called upon to use this test
when judging the guilt or innocence of their peers. It is especially
important in this context to provide an understandable rule which can be
consistently implemented by a diverse population.
Uniform application is especially crucial in light of the enormous
stakes involving the reasonable doubt standard. The consequences facing
the accused include the ruin of reputation, the loss of liberty, or even the
ending of life. Jurors apply reasonable doubt at the most important stage
of the proceedings, during the deliberation upon the verdict of guilt or
innocence.
In spite of the obvious need for knowledgeable and consistent
application of reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court has failed to act to
fill the void of understanding on this issue. Granted, the power of any
court is limited to reviewing the true controversy before it. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in reviewing state court jury instructions
is confined to the narrow question of the constitutionality of the
definitions actually read to the juries. In this regard, Justice O'Connor
pointedly2 bemoaned the lack of supervisory power over the state
4
courts.

1

However, these concerns simply do not prevent the Supreme Court
from providing adequate guidance on a constitutional right, particularly
when that right affects the very structure of every trial.14 The Court
must acknowledge that, at a minimum, a right of due process can only be
guaranteed when it is understood by those called upon to enforce it.
Presently such comprehension of reasonable doubt is severely lacking.
Judges, unaware of the true scope of reasonable doubt, cluster toward
previously tested definitions regardless of their current coherence.
Indeed, some courts are in danger of becoming Skinnerian pigeons,
offering nothing to jurors but talismanic repetitions of the phrase
reasonable doubt, fearful that any explanation of the standard will expose
their cases to constitutional challenge.
No rule of law can sustain such improper use. To remain robust, a
constitutional rule must be meaningfully analyzed so that the values it
protects can be genuinely advanced. It is this task that the Supreme
Court failed to perform in Victor.
In weighing the jury instructions defining reasonable doubt, the very
tools used to implement this constitutional right, the various opinions in
Victor tell us more about what is forbidden than what is allowed. All

142.
143.

Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991).
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Justices either frowned upon or completely excoriated the "moral
certainty" formulation of reasonable doubt. Defending the attacks on
"strong probabilities" by Justices Ginsberg and Blackmun, the majority
merely concluded that this definition was saved by the very words it was
supposed to define: reasonable doubt. Justice Blackmun condemned
"substantial doubt" to the fate it suffered in Cage, while the majority
anemically defended this language as "somewhat problematic." Finally,
the "hesitate to act" phrasing received punishing treatment by Justices
Ginsburg and Blackmun.
The Victor opinions are the equivalent of a cookbook that shows the
reader how to bake a cake by listing a series of recipes to avoid. Rather
than freeing states to bake by their own recipes, Victor paralyzes
legislators and judges across the nation. Law makers and courts are not
emboldened into action by clear guidelines. Rather, they are tempted to
avoid entering the confusing kitchen altogether and to merely offer the
few phrases that have previously avoided reversal, however stale those
may be. The Court squandered its opportunity to preserve the health of
the due process mandate that every conviction be based on proof of each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, due to the Court's inaction,
the reasonable doubt standard is in danger of further atrophying into a
doctrine that consists of more of rote form than of understandable
substance.

